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A Socialist Horizon: Crisis, Hegemony, and the 
Promise of a New Party 
Aug 31 
Of the many epochal changes sweeping American politics, one of the most 
poignant if least reported was the dissolution of the International Socialist 
Organization (ISO) this past year.  The ISO was never a large organization - at 
its peak it had perhaps 1200 members, and it averaged around half to two-thirds 
that number.  But its activists like to say they "punched above their weight," and 
it's true: there were few strikes or social movements in which one would not see 
either their banner or their paper, sold by members as much a sign of their 
loyalty to the organization as any practical notion of political efficacy.  And ISO 
activists have been instrumental to U.S. social movements, from the Chicago 
Teachers' Union strike in 2012, to the Palestine solidarity movement, to anti-
death penalty campaigning in the 1990s.  I was never a member of the ISO but 
attended their yearly conference in Chicago and experienced it as an almost 
ritual performance of the Marxist left's collective memory:  from singing The 
International, to staging continued debates about the legacy of the Bolshevik 
Revolution, to keeping books by Rosa Luxembourg, Leon Trotsky, and V.I. 
Lenin in print.  One got the sense that the ISO was not just an organization, but 
a living archive of the Marxian left, not so much a fossil as a porous tribe, bent 
on continuing their vital traditions "in a dusty desert of dollars and smartness," 
to borrow a phrase from W.E.B Du Bois.   
            It is often said that the ISO formed just as the New Left was collapsing 
under the weight of its own contradictions while the resurgent right rose in the 
late 1970s.  But that is not entirely accurate.  While some debate the origin myth 
and exact lineage of ISO, its roots are both in the Socialist Workers Party 
(SWP) and later in the International Socialists (IS).  These Trotskyist groups 
saw themselves as the true inheritors of the Bolshevik Revolution and Lenin's 
vanguard party, a revolution and a movement they felt to have been sold out, 
crushed by a Stalinist counter-revolution.  The SWP's crowning moment in the 
United States was the Minneapolis Teamsters Strike they helped to organize, a 
militant labor battle that shut down the entire city for days.  The strike not only 
saw workers effectively control large parts of the city, it also helped to build a 
new labor movement against both a bureaucratic leadership they saw as pre-
figuratively Stalinist and also an increasingly concentrated monopoly 
capitalism:  it seemed the birth pangs of what could be a new workers' 
movement, if not a new revolutionary moment.  This vision of a Leninist party 
was briefly revived in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the "New Communist 
Movement," but its social base and concentration in urban working-class self-
organization was absent.  Despite thousands of dedicated cadre members across 
various Trotskyist and Maoist organizations, this party model seemed, by the 
1980s, to have played itself out. ISO's collapse could be seen as the final closing 
of the 20th century, the last chapter of the Bolshevik Revolution that had, 
comet-like, illuminated both the hopes and fears of human liberation for the 
better part of a tumultuous century.   
            And yet it's hard to also miss the fact that the ISO's collapse— triggered 
if not constituted by an alleged sexual assault cover up— coincided with the rise 
the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), now the largest socialist 
organization in the U.S. since World War II.  While some in DSA have gloated 
over the collapse of ISO as proof of their own non-Leninist organizational 
structure and history, to me, that is a far too glib expression of what historical 
transitions we are now witnessing.  Afterall, DSA has done little to recruit these 
new members into its ranks, and for much of DSA's history it, like ISO, was a 
small organization on the margins of the left. I would go so far as to say that 
DSA is not the same organization it was five years ago. Nearly all local and 
national leadership has been replaced by new members, and many of the new 
resolutions adopted at local and national conventions have also radically 
changed both its direction and its structure, pushing it to the left, embracing the 
boycott against Israel and the creation of an Afro-Socialist Caucus, while 
moving it away from its long-held "realignment" strategy inside the Democratic 
Party.  Rather, I would suggest, the collapse of the ISO and the radical 
transformation and explosive growth of DSA are both contradictory signs of a 
new historical conjuncture.  
            What strikes me more than the differences between ISO and the 
resurgent DSA are not their differences (which are many) but their singular 
similarity as socialist parties. While the DSA is not formally a third party in the 
sense that the Labor Party or Green Party is (it is technically a non-profit) it is 
far more party-like than any of the social movements of the last few 
decades.  Even a glance at its last national convention would suggest the DSA is 
a far-cry from the horizontalist social movements of the 1990s and early 2000s, 
such as Occupy Wall Street and the Global Justice Movement, with their 
consensus decision making, affinity groups, and lack of formal leadership 
structure.  Unlike the social movements of the last decades that have focused on 
creating decentralized networks, unencumbered by unifying demands or an 
articulated base, the DSA is a class-focused organization that is intent on both 
engaging state power through elections as well as placing concrete demands on 
the state for large social policy transformations through grassroots campaigns, 
such as Medicare for All and the Green New Deal. As a writer and activist who 
came of age during the affinity groups and consensus-decision making of the 
Global Justice Movement, this realignment not only toward socialism but to a 
socialist organization is perhaps the most dramatic historical rupture I've 
witnessed in my time.  If one had wandered into the 2017 DSA Chicago 
national convention, one might be forgiven if they felt they were witnessing a 
ritual from a previous century:  mostly clean-cut young people electing new 
national leadership, forwarding motions from various formal factions, voting by 
card and by proxy, deploying the Anglo-Saxon strictures of Roberts Rules of 
Order.  There were T-shirts, buttons, candidates, and dues. Despite the end of 
the Leninist party, it all looked all very much like a party to me. 
  
The Party Fordism Built 
            So what to make of this end of the end of history?  The collapse and 
rebirth within a year of a socialist party?  Perhaps the best place to look would 
be the last time there was a mass-based socialist party in the U.S.— the "red 
decade" of the 1930s.  Much like the rise of the DSA, the rise of the Communist 
Party in the United States (CPUSA) did not seem initially very 
promising.  Small and marginal, the CPUSA was located among isolated 
enclaves of Russian and Jewish immigrants and a tight cadre of African 
American and bohemian intellectuals clustered in New York City and 
Chicago.  How then did it go from a tiny party of a few hundred members to an 
average membership of 100,000 throughout much of the 1930s and 1940s?  Not 
only did the CPUSA grow exponentially, its influence extended well beyond its 
membership base.  At its peak, party members were elected to leadership of 
over a dozen major labor unions, organized the largest nationwide student strike 
the country has seen, counted nearly all major African American intellectuals in 
its orbit, as well as numerous writers, directors, actors, and artists, and 
organized the only socialist army to fight overseas, the Abraham Lincoln 
Brigade.  While the support, and yes, even prestige, of the Soviet Union was not 
at times insignificant, Soviet support cannot alone explain the rise of the 
CPUSA nor its broad influence.  Indeed, focus on the Soviet or Bolshevik 
nature of the CPUSA hides far more than it reveals about its stunning growth 
and brief, hegemonic sway over the cultural life of the U.S. life.    
            Counterintuitively perhaps, Michael Denning's 1997 The Cultural Front 
is the most helpful text to understand the rise of the CPUSA, precisely because 
he locates the party in the larger cultural and political transformations of the 
"Popular Front era."  It's not that he thinks the CPUSA was insignificant, 
indeed, he suggests "it was the most influential left organization of the period." 
Rather Denning argues, to understand the CPUSA's growth and influence in the 
era between the late 1920s to the Cold War, one must look beyond its 
membership rolls to the "condensation" of social forces that cohered to allow it 
to flourish.[i]  Taking a Gramscian approach, Denning looks at the "long 
Popular Front" as the emergence of an "historical bloc," a new constellation of 
social forces that for a time were hegemonic.[ii] Calling it at times the "Age of 
the CIO" and at other times the New Deal coalition, Denning conceives of 
power as less something one party or class holds (or does not hold), but rather 
an alliance of social forces— parties, unions, social movements, cultural actors. 
Such blocs do not seize the forces of production so much as gain consent and 
influence through multiple forms of representation, whether they be political, 
cultural, or economic.  What is significant in this approach is that it avoids 
nearly all of the tedious pitfalls in most histories of the Communist Party that 
focus on party line and schisms, the Comintern and the Soviet Union, to 
understand how it wielded such unprecedented influence in the United States.   
            It is doubtful that without the Great Depression the Communist Party 
would have risen to a stature of influence.  It may seem to go without saying 
that the Depression was a crisis for capitalism.  Yet for Denning, it was not 
simply that the crisis laid bare suffering under the free market and that people 
awoke to its ills to become Communists; it was a crisis of representation, in all 
its forms.  A crisis, as Gramsci notes, occurs when political parties and the 
people they represent are "detached" from one another, when "the men who 
constitute, represent, and lead them, are no longer recognized by their class (or 
fraction of a class) as its expression."[iii]  The schism between representatives 
and represented for Gramsci leaves "the field open for violent solutions, for the 
activities of unknown forces."  It must be remembered that Gramsci was arguing 
with the so-called "orthodox" Marxists who understood the state to merely be 
the "central committee of the bourgeoisie."  He was also arguing with Marxists 
who felt workers would respond spontaneously when their objective conditions 
were revealed to them.  Rather, for Gramsci, political parties, and the cultural 
field as a whole, are complex acts of "articulation," not simply a one-to-one 
correspondence.  It was not an objective increase in the level of suffering, but 
rather a sense "the ruling class has failed" and a "'crisis of authority' is spoken 
of" that ignited a new political class formation.  In the 1930s, this meant that the 
entire idea of the "working class" was up for grabs, realigned, in motion, no 
longer content to be represented by the Democratic Party, the AFL, or 
Hollywood. The Depression was a crisis of hegemony, a cultural and political 
crisis, because the elite was not able to comprehend, much less address, the 
economic crisis of its own making.  
            Jodi Dean argues that the CPUSA grew in the 1930s because it was able 
to bind people's affective needs, organizing their desires within a coherent 
program and a cadre of comrades and fellow-travelers.[iv]  While that was true 
for individual or even collective members, it does not explain how and why the 
CPUSA became the vehicle for a larger social imaginary.  One of Denning's 
more profound insights about the movements of the 1930s was to note that the 
nature of the working class was in a profound state of change.  Not only were 
working people realigning their political allegiances across racial and regional 
lines, the working class itself was in process of radical transformation. As 
Gramsci was one of the first to note, Fordism was not just a new means of 
production, it was a cultural system as well.  It produced "a new type of 
worker," and new types of social, cultural, and sexual relations.[v]  For the first 
time, second generation immigrant workers and African Americans in urban and 
industrial centers shared a common condition of labor, a common language, and 
a common mass culture, from factory work to radio plays to swing music to 
gangster films.  Working-class urban heroes such as James Cagney, Duke 
Ellington, and Barbara Stanwyck were as much a part of a shared mass culture 
as boxing and jazz. One organizer recounted white and Black members listening 
to a Joe Louis fight on the radio before going to recruit members for its 
integrated locals, and Richard Wright famously wrote of the Louis-Baer match 
as leading to a jubilant, spontaneous uprising among working-class African 
Americans on Chicago's South Side.[vi] The Popular Front, Denning argues, 
was not just a movement about the realignment of a political left, but a counter-
culture of Fordism, a way to reimagine the modernity of the machine-
age.  Taking over factories and stopping the machines during massive sit-down 
strikes could be seen as not just a labor tactic but a metaphor for the 
movement:  not to leave modernity, but subject it to a working-class, democratic 
will. 
            Within the mid-century cultural and material matrix of Fordism, the 
Communist Party, unlike the Democrats or Republicans, built an entire way of 
life, vertically and horizontally integrated, with softball leagues, newspapers, 
dances and activity groups like the Friends of the Earth (camping) and the John 
Reed Clubs (writing) that not only provided for the political needs of its 
members, but its social, even romantic needs as well.  "You could live an entire 
life within that world," one former Communist related in Vivian Gornick's oral 
history of the movement.[vii] The Communist Party, like the centralized and 
Taylorized mass culture of the period, was constituted by a sense of totality and 
organization that marked both work and leisure. The Communist Party was not 
just a political organization, but a cultural one as well, one that demanded of its 
members not just activism but also a new cultural sensibility.  Mike Gold wrote 
for the New Masses that party members should attend Harlem jazz clubs; 
interracial dating was not only sanctioned but officially encouraged.  The 
CPUSA emerged as the radical organization of the Great Depression precisely 
because it so much resembled the culture of it operated within. As capitalism's 
"other," Communism organized much like Fordist corporations it opposed.  In 
other words, it is not that the CPUSA hit upon a correct strategy by design so 
much as it was the organization that formed a structural homology to its cultural 
and political moment.  
            The CPUSA's power was not primarily discursive or based on its ever-
shifting proclamations.  The CPUSA's rhetoric and strategy changed 
dramatically through the 1930s and 1940s, from its revolutionary "Third Period" 
in which it formed independent radical unions and denounced the New Deal as 
"social fascism" to the Popular Front period in which it made an alliance with 
liberals and other leftists against the far-right at home and fascists abroad. 
Nothing exemplifies the shift better than Kenneth Burke's speech before the 
1935 Writers' Congress, in which he suggested that the Party abandon its alien 
sounding language of the "worker" to a more populist and familiar democratic 
language of the "people." Burke was denounced by none other than Mike Gold 
for being a "nationalist," and his speech was panned.  Yet as Denning notes, 
Burke spoke for "the vast majority of the Depression left," and his language of 
popular democracy was officially adopted by the Party later that 
year.[viii]  While the Party and much of the organizing of the Depression left 
may have been class-based and internationalist, much of the rhetoric and 
imagery was on the terrain of the conjunctural:  redefining a popular subject of 
sovereignty.   
  
"Democratize Everything": The Populist After-Party 
            Flash forward a half century and, in many ways, we traverse similar 
cultural and political ground.  The organizations that represented the working 
class (i.e., large bureaucratic unions of the AFL-CIO and the Democratic Party) 
are either in decline or in crisis; the working classes themselves have 
"detached," in Gramsci's words, from their membership and their leadership.  In 
addition, inequality is at the highest rate since before the Great Depression; 
racial segregation is at an all-time high; our planet is in a state of fundamental 
rupture with its ability to sustain human life; the far-right is again on the 
march.  The 30-year consensus around neoliberalism would seem to have 
crumbled; this is a crisis of hegemony in much the same way the Great 
Depression threw all ruling-class institutions into disarray.  People are again in 
the streets. In the U.S., there has been a long twenty year chain of spontaneous 
and horizontalist uprisings against the harsh classed, raced, and gendered 
contours of neoliberalism: The Global Justice Movement, the direct actions 
against the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the mass-marches of the immigrant 
rights movement, Occupy Wall Street, #BlackLivesMatter, and the Women's 
March.  It is unclear that the ruling classes have the legitimacy or the self-
confidence to restore order, much less to solve the multiple crises facing them - 
primarily a crisis of legitimacy.  It is not surprising that "socialism," in such a 
conjuncture, has reemerged.   
            And yet, the landscape of both capitalism and the left have radically 
changed. As Chilean activist and writer Marta Harnecker notes, the rise of 
globalization, neoliberalism and the end of the Cold War has also led to what 
she refers to as the "social disorientation" of both the working class and the 
left.[ix] The organization of workers into giant Fordist factories in urban 
centers, the growth of social and cultural institutions, such as massive schools 
and state colleges, also did the work of organizing the people into shared sites of 
social production and reproduction.  Globalization and neoliberalism have not 
only widened the gap between the rich and the poor within and between nations, 
they have dramatically reorganized the economy away from large-scale urban 
manufacturing to decentralized and increasingly mobile just-in-time production. 
While this shattered what was left of the large AFL-CIO unions and sent union 
membership into a free-fall, it also disrupted the material basis for social, even 
socialist organizing. White flight, suburban sprawl, strip malls, the spread of 
automobile culture and online micro-communities have not only changed the 
way social life is organized, they have also disrupted the forms of organization 
on which the "old left" was built. If the counter-culture of modernism was based 
on the chance encounter on the city street and collective anonymity of the 
factory and rail car, suburban sprawl and the post-modern cubicle entered a new 
form of fragmented alienation, one that is as isolated as it is often subcultural.   
             While "socialism" and "the party" may have reemerged, they have 
reemerged on radically different terrain than the last time capitalism faced such 
a crisis.  As Ernesto Laclau, perhaps the foremost writer on Gramsci for the 
current age, writes in On Populist Reason, "we can no longer understand 
capitalism as purely an economic reality, but as a complex in which economic, 
political, military, technological, and other determinations....enter into the 
determination of the movement of the whole."[x]  While one could argue 
whether or not capitalism was ever "purely an economic reality" governed by 
the "contradictions of the commodity form," his description of "globalized 
capitalism" describes if not the experience of exploitation, the affective terrain 
of its contemporary subjectivity.  Despite a common experience of working for 
wages, the end of the 20th century has witnessed a critique of capitalism along 
multiple, intersecting fronts:  the biosphere, the racialized state, the national 
border, the predatory logic of financialized capitalism, and sexual 
violence.  Rather than attempt to unify the multiple points of exploitation at the 
point of production, Laclau suggests the term "populism" should condense the 
shifting antagonisms that shatter the "harmonious continuity of the social" into a 
series of constitutive demands.  Unlike Hardt and Negri's concept of the 
"multitude" in which they imagine a "nomadic, rhizomatic" unity without 
demand or claim to hegemony, Laclau's formation is decidedly 
political:  demands on the state are what unify the new class logic of the 
"99%."  In other words, DSA has reemerged as an organization to engage with 
the state, precisely because the working class has been historically disorganized 
by three decades of neoliberal assault.   
            The often-criticized "vagueness" of socialism since the rise of DSA is 
not a weakness of the movement, but rather a constitutive element of its populist 
nature.  As Laclau writes of populist movements, they are not the stereotype of a 
"people" against an "elite" but a democratic "social demand" that produces itself 
discursively to define an irreparable social antagonism.  Populists redefine 
democracy from a cohesive consensus to constitutive state of conflict.  Society 
functions, as many liberals like to argue, through debate, discussion, 
compromise, and mediation; populists redefine the social totality as riven by 
irreparable "frontiers" of contestation.  Laclau includes in his idea of populism 
not just popular democratic movements such as The Levelers or Hugo Chavez's 
"Bolivarian Revolution," but the Bolshevik's slogan "All Power to the Soviets" 
and Mao's construction of "the people."  For Laclau, populist's "vagueness and 
indeterminacy are not shortcomings of a discourse about social reality, but in 
some circumstances, inscribed in social reality as such."[xi]  In diverse, uneven 
movements, such as the Bolivarian Revolution or the Popular Front, "populism" 
articulates a rupture in the ruling hegemony that can bring together a new 
political subject around demands for the state.  While the DSA may be for the 
working class, it is not necessarily of it, at least in the same way the same 
second-generation industrial working class of the Communist Party could easily 
define its class roots.[xii]  Most of DSA's membership is not organized around a 
shared identity or form of exploitation, but rather around a shared set of 
demands that unify a heterogeneous subjectivity under capitalism.  DSA's major 
campaigns— for rent control, socialized medicine, and a Green New Deal— are 
class demands, but they are also demands that bring together, by their nature, 
broad constituencies that are determined by many points of structural violence 
and exploitation by capitalism.  Such campaigns are not attempts to seize the 
means of production, but rather to seize hegemony and usher in a new 
consensus about democracy.   
            That such campaigns address their grievances to the state as a radical 
series of reforms should not be understood as DSA's liberalism against a more 
radical Communist Party, as some charge. Rather such demands and such 
modes of organization are a sign of the current DSA membership's materialism, 
a sign that they intuitively or strategically understand the historical 
conjuncture.  As Gramsci wrote after the defeat of the Bolshevik Revolution to 
bring Communism to Europe, our "situation is 'democratic', because the broad 
working classes are disorganized, dispersed and fragmented into the broad 
undifferentiated people."[xiii]  In a fragmented and heterogeneous working 
class that as often aligns their own subjectivity along multiple intersecting 
identity formations— gender, race, religion, class— the DSA offers an anti-
capitalist populism, a political articulatory process by which a new kind of 
movement can cohere.  Such a political formation is expressed "discursively" as 
Laclau suggests, not "empirically," in so far as it recognizes itself not by region 
or workplace, but what program it puts forth.  The campaigns DSA engages in 
are not simply ways to achieve victories for a broader working-class struggle, 
but rather they are ways to articulate a constituency, to challenge the hegemony 
of neoliberal governance. It's crucial to point out that such demands for a Green 
New Deal or socialized medicine are bids not only to save the planet but also 
expose the gap between the Democratic Party's claim to representation and their 
ability to represent the needs of their constituency.   Hegemony as Laclau states, 
is not a "re-ordering of things," it is rather "a partiality that can become the 
name of an impossible totality."[xiv]   Socialism is the expression of a new 
political subject that can say it represents the whole, by challenging the state to 
change its class orientation. When Maria Svart, the national director of the 
DSA, said she wanted to "democratize everything," it is a revolutionary demand 
to include the economy and the military implicitly, subjects off-limits to 
democratic control and redefine "democracy" as a source of class conflict, not 
harmony.[xv]   
            The vagueness of socialism does not run counter to Jodi Dean's claim 
that what's needed is a new party.  As Dean suggests in her manifesto, The 
Communist Horizon, radicals have never taken the claims of horizontal 
democracy as seriously as they proclaim. All movements, she argues, are 
vanguard acts; they make claims of representation. We are the 99%. The 
Movement for Black Lives. They claim to represent "the people," however they 
are defined against an elite or a class or an institution. Yet the question Dean 
poses is not so much whether we will commit acts of representation, but rather 
whether we will build organizations that can contain difference and the multiple 
gaps, omissions and divisions within capitalism.[xvi] DSA by that logic is a 
party, yet it is a very different kind of party than the one organized by the 
CPUSA.  While the DSA has elected officials and votes on resolutions 
governing the organization, the chapters and branches are all almost entirely 
autonomous -- there is very little the centralized structure of the National 
Political Committee (NPC) can do to direct what chapters work on.  That said, 
there is enough structure and unanimity so that the DSA has coalesced around a 
few central campaigns and principles, such as mentioned above: the Green New 
Deal, socialized medicine, electoralism, and rent control.  This form of 
flexibility, cohered by a discursive unity of key demands, marks DSA as the 
party-form for a post-Fordist, "globalized," mode of capital accumulation  
            That is not to say there are no contradictions.  Just as the "democratic 
centralism" of the CPUSA allowed it to both resemble and challenge the 
centralized corporations it organized against, so too did its centralism make it 
vulnerable to sclerotic sloganeering, top-down decision making, and state 
repression when its leaders were eventually imprisoned under the Smith 
Act.  While DSA may at some point come under assault by the state, that is not 
its main challenge at the moment.  Like the CPUSA, the contradictions faced by 
the DSA are embedded within the cultural contradictions of the current 
conjuncture.  As a hybrid democratic party, the DSA constitutes itself 
discursively and symbolically through demands made on the state.  It has no 
empirical base, as did the CPUSA, in the giant factories and ghettos, large 
industrial unions, and immigrant neighborhoods of the modern period.  This is 
not a critique but rather an observation of how the terrain of the working class 
has changed.  Yet these articulatory acts naturally lend themselves to 
replication:  who is to say who represents the "true" DSA?  Since the DSA is not 
governed by a centralized NPC, this by its nature allows for a proliferation of 
discursive mobilizations.   
            Concretely, numerous ideological caucuses have sprung up, each with a 
narrow interpretation of what they think "socialism" should mean.  These are 
distinct from "identity caucuses," such as the queer caucus, or Afro-Socialists, 
which form to address historical exclusions and hierarchies that continue even 
in a socialist organization.  The ideological caucuses are discursive platforms 
and represent programmatic definitions of socialism.  While there are real 
debates on either end of the spectrum that represent for the most part latent and 
perhaps receding strains within DSA's history, such as the "horizontalists" or 
libertarian socialists or the social democrats, the vast majority of DSA's tens of 
thousands of members agree on the broad outlines of DSA's programmatic 
goals, organizing tactics, and they are unified around the central demands 
mentioned in previous paragraphs.  In the same way the rapidly changing party 
lines of the CPUSA revealed the political limitations of democratic centralism, 
so too the proliferation of ideological caucuses (there are roughly a dozen now 
and counting) represent the political limitations of discursively constituted 
forms of populist organizing.  Already whole chapters have split over what 
amount to relatively minor ideological differences when it would seem 
abundantly clear that DSA's entire purpose is to find broad common ground 
among working people.  In a party organized nodally, much like the web, the 
temptation for further fragmentation and subcultural differentiation may prove 
too great.   
            Still, the prospects for the moment seem hopeful.  Unlike countries with 
large far-right movements among the young, such as India, Italy, Brazil and 
Hungary, young people in the United States seem like they are moving to the 
left in what looks to be a generational realignment.  The Sanders campaign and 
the election of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib have moved the 
ballast of the Democratic Party far enough to the left so that Kamala Harris, 
Nancy Pelosi, and Elizabeth Warren have had to respond to whether or not they 
are "socialists"; six socialists were recently elected to city council in Chicago; 
the New York Times recently endorsed a socialist candidate for Queens District 
Attorney; and New York state just passed the first progressive rent-control law 
in over a half-century, a campaign in which the New York DSA played a large 
part.  It would seem that the DSA, like the Communist Party, is not the entire 
story of America's current move to the left, at least at the grassroots, but it has 
emerged as an ideological and organizational center for this moment of 
transformation.  Of course, it's impossible to know where the current crisis of 
hegemony will take us.  Trump is also a sign of shifting alignments and a 
crumbling political order, no longer capable of summoning the self-confidence 
or mass support necessary to effectively rule.  And it seems that the Democratic 
Party, along with its superstructure of media outlets, non-profits, think-tanks, 
and affiliated union leadership, has actually been more capable than the GOP in 
maintaining a grip on power, even as its base falls away.  Indeed, it may very 
well be the effectiveness of the Democratic Party and its aligned superstructural 
support that provides an opening for the far-right, if it is successful in containing 
movements to its left.  Much remains to be seen.  But the return to the party and 
thus the return to the state in this moment of crisis may be what saves us from 
the combined nightmares of fascism, as well as economic and ecological 
collapse.   
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